// dead rust-lang/rustfmt/pull/5394 :(
#![feature(
    decl_macro,
    duration_constructors,
    iterator_try_collect,
    never_type,
    once_cell_try,
    seek_stream_len
)]
#![allow(clippy::future_not_send)] // will get to fix these later

//! # About, Licensing and More
//!
//! Check the README.md for entry-level documentation.
//!
//! # Where is my documentation?
//!
//! For ease of development and centralized **corrent** information, this codebase will serve both
//! as project documentation AND documentation for the behavior of the OpenID Connect server.
//!
//! Might be hard to figure out how the program behaves based on the code, but I will try to put
//! behavior parameters in [`consts`], so that might be a good starting point to know some stuff
//! (e.g. profile profile picture search path).
//!
//! Checking out [`conf`] might be useful too to know what could've been configured by server
//! administrators and less likely but maybe there can also be certain parameters in [`args`].
//!
//! I will try to keep those 3 modules as documented as possible, please feel free to open any
//! issues/PRs regarding information in there.
//!
//! # Public Information
//!
//! To make sure this application doesn't expose any public imformation it's important to define
//! what public information we are willing to expose. The application deals with user information
//! so it must leak at least some information, to make sure we don't overreach, we must have clear
//! where we draw the line.
//!
//! By default all information is private, but this application might leak by default:
//!
//! - **User system information:** Unix's UID of a given username.
//! - **User profile pictures:** See [`consts::USER_PFP_PATHS`].
//! - **User's `autorized_ssh_keys`:** See [`consts::AUTHORIZED_KEYS_PATH`].
//!
//! Note that no file information within user's home can be accessed until the user adds `o+x`
//! permissions on their home directory. Once this is done, only state of files regarding the
//! previous can be publicly accessible, there's no arbirtary path reading.
//!
//! Any user information is checked ASAP against the allowed groups (see [`conf::Unix::groups`]) to
//! fail fast without exposing any personal information for users alien to these groups. That means
//! that any reference to the "user", will assume its already from an allowed group, if its not a
//! group member, it will be treated as nonexistent.
//!
//! Information about existance of a user alien to the configured groups might vulnerable to timing
//! attacks though.
//!
//! TODO: This was clearly defined after some API was already written so these assumptions will
//! need to be reviewed for the old code (notably pfp logic).

use std::fs::File;

use clap::Parser;

use crate::ext::FileExt as _;

pub mod args;
pub mod auth;
pub mod conf;
pub mod consts;
pub mod db;
pub mod ext;
pub mod serdes;
pub mod server;
pub mod utils;

#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let args = args::Args::parse();
    #[cfg(feature = "log")]
    env_logger::init_from_env(env_logger::Env::new().default_filter_or("info"));
    let conf = if let Some(conf) = File::try_open(&args.conf) {
        conf::Config::from_toml_file(&mut conf?)?
    } else {
        println!(
            "\x1b[30;43mWRN\x1b[0m: \x1b[35m{:?}\x1b[0m not found, using default configuration",
            args.conf.display()
        );
        conf::Config::default()
    };

    // o tsukare su-mmer, awaaai yumeniii shiii oooo-tome, wa, hitoshireeeezu, cryyyyying
    // (idek japanese but im vibing)
    println!("\n\x1b[1;3;4;33mConfiguration\x1b[0m: {conf:#?}\n");

    server::start_app(args, conf, db::DB::new()).await?;

    Ok(())
}